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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
        This thesis will focus on the introduction of American fast food and beverages 
into the Soviet Union by PepsiCo and McDonald’s Corporation between 1959 and 
1991. The efforts of these companies to sell their products in the USSR present two 
fascinating case studies about the interaction of Cold War ideology, international 
politics, popular culture, and business. PepsiCo, led by CEO Donald Kendall, was the 
first officially sanctioned American consumer product to establish itself in the 
socialist nation since Ford Motors in the 1930s. The PepsiCo case is a perfect 
example of how something so seemingly simple as selling bottled soda, can evolve 
into a major international event with wide reaching political implications. Bringing 
Pepsi to the USSR involved the participation of the 20th century’s most famous Cold 
War figures from both superpowers. PepsiCo also become interconnected with 
various Cold War policies such as détente and the Soviet Union’s shift into a 
consumer society.  
        McDonald’s, on the other hand, was brought to the USSR by George Cohen, an 
American lawyer from Chicago, who became president of the company’s Canadian 
operations during the 1960s. Much like Pepsi’s introduction into the Soviet Union, 
the opening of a McDonald’s in the heart of the USSR was met with worldwide press 
attention. The golden arches of Moscow became emblematic of Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
policy of perestroika, and an overall improvement in East-West relations. Bringing 
McDonald’s to the Soviet Union also highlighted some of the worst aspects of the 
Soviet state in a way the Pepsi deal did not. The broken and inefficient economy, the 
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suffocating bureaucracy, the rampant corruption, and the lack of service quality all 
reared their ugly heads as Cohen struggled to open his business in Moscow.  
        From the way average Soviet citizens reacted to these Western consumer goods, 
it is obvious that they both represented much more than soda and hamburgers. 
American fast food was as much a cultural and political import as it was a consumer 
product. When Pepsi first hit the Soviet market it was a runaway success. Local 
retail venders could hardly keep their shelves stocked for more than a day.  Over the 
following years PepsiCo operations steadily expanded from a single bottling plant in 
Southern Russia to over 50 plants in every major urban center due to insatiable 
consumer demand. When the American and Soviet media covered Pepsi’s expansion 
into the USSR they frequently used phrases like “improved international relations” 
or “an opening to the West.” The cultural and political overtones in the press 
reporting are plainly obvious. The opening of a McDonald’s in the center of Moscow 
was met with a similar level of excitement. In the bitter cold of the Russian winter, 
people queued outside for hours just to get their first taste of “authentic” American 
cuisine. The Moscow McDonald’s would become one of the busiest restaurants in 
the world. No other restaurant has ever received as much media attention as the 
Moscow McDonald’s, which speaks volumes about its political and cultural 
importance.  
        The political significance of Pepsi and McDonald’s is also accentuated by the fact 
that Soviet General Secretaries became personally involved in both the Pepsi and 
McDonald’s deals. Leonid Brezhnev himself was present as the very first Soviet-
made Pepsi rolled off the assembly line in 1974. In the late 1980’s Mikhail 
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Gorbachev was an active participant in the negotiations that would result in the first 
McDonald’s in Russia. When Pepsi or McDonald’s expanded their operations into 
France, Britain, or Germany, it would have been seen as absolutely ridiculous for the 
leaders of those countries to get personally involved in something so petty. In the 
Soviet Union however, almost everything was politicized, and the introduction of 
two major American firms was an event that would require involvement from the 
highest levels of government. 
         Food has always had a strong link to national culture and identity.1  Sushi, with 
its elegant designs has blended food with art, and is readily associated with 
Japanese culture’s love of aesthetic beauty.2 Sushi can now be found in almost every 
country around the world, but it has not lost its identify as Japanese cultural 
property.3  Much in the same way, the McDonald’s brand became the ambassador of 
American culture into the USSR. Where sushi represents Japanese beauty and grace, 
McDonald’s represented American speed, efficiency, ingenuity, and quality. By the 
time the Moscow McDonald’s opened its doors in 1990, the company had spread to 
117 countries worldwide and was seen as the universal symbol of Americanism.4 
The Pepsi case was different in a number of ways as it offered the Soviets an 
opportunity to export some of their own cultural identity in the form of vodka. Part 
of the deal that allowed PepsiCo to bring its cola in the USSR also granted the Soviet 
                                                        
1 James L. Watson and Melissa L. Caldwell, eds. The Cultural Politics of Food and Eating : A Reader. 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.) See introduction. 
 
2 Ibid. 15 
 
3 Ibid. 19 
 
4 Ibid. 2 
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regime the opportunity to sell one of their most famous brands in the Western 
market, Stolichnaya. In fact, one of the reasons Soviet vodka sold so well in the West 
was precisely because it had been so closely associated as a genuine Russian 
cultural export. Part of the appeal of Soviet-made vodka was its “Russianness” and 
the fact that it was made behind the Iron Curtain. Americans knew very little about 
the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, which only added to the mystique and 
allure of Stolichnaya.  
 
Western Imports in the USSR 
        Throughout the turbulent history of the USSR, Western imports were looked 
upon with considerable trepidation by communist ideologues. The utopian rhetoric 
of Soviet leaders called for the creation of a society free from the corrupting 
influences of Western bourgeois culture. The Soviet regime went to great lengths to 
promote the development of their own unique socialist culture, and imbued it with 
didactic qualities that were designed to liberate Soviet citizens from the lure of petty 
consumption. Yet for all of their idealistic ambitions, the Soviets often fell quite 
short, and frequently depended on Western imports to supplement their economic, 
technological, and cultural deficiencies. Even as early as the Stalinist 1930s, the 
Soviet regime was forced to import Western technical equipment and advisors in 
order to jump-start its own industry.5 After Stalin’s death, the Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev governments lived in a tenuous love-hate relationship with Western 
                                                        
5 See Steven Kotkin’s Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995., and Lewis H. Siegelbaum’s Cars for Comrades : The Life of the Soviet Automobile. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2008. 
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products. Nikita Khrushchev’s reforms ushered in a new era of Socialism for the 
USSR, as he focused on increasing the material standard of living of the nation’s 
citizens. According to the eccentric General Secretary, the Soviet people must focus 
on increasing their production, because in twenty years they would be the world’s 
biggest consumers. Leonid Brezhnev was the first General secretary to introduce the 
idea of “socialist consumption” into the USSR when he spoke at the CPSU Congress 
in 1971.6 Post-Stalinist leaders knew that beating the capitalists would require more 
than just out-producing them in armaments; it would require a considerable 
investment into consumer items as well. Unfortunately, the Soviet economy could 
never keep up with Soviet citizens’ voracious demand the Soviets had for cultural 
products. As a result, Western films, television, music, fashion, and literature all 
found their way into the country over the course of the 1950s and 1960s whether 
the regime wanted them or not.   
            Unlike other cultural imports, American fast food was a bit slower in its 
penetration of the Soviet market. This can be attributed to the fact that it is 
inherently more difficult to move large quantities of perishable food items across 
Soviet borders without the government’s consent. Things like music, films, and 
books are easy to pack into a suitcase and then smuggle across the border. Music 
could be recorded using personal tape recorders from a live performer or an 
original vinyl album, and then rerecorded, as friends and neighbors shared the 
music of their favorite Western artists. Naturally the sound quality was not very 
                                                        
6 Sergey I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City : the West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet 
Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985. (Baltimore; Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2010.) 9-10 
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impressive, but the ease with which music could be distributed made it extremely 
difficult for the authorities to regulate. Furthermore, the exchange of films is 
generally a much simpler process than food, since one only needs the original film 
roll, which can then be reproduced locally by Soviet facilities. The process of making 
a foreign film a commercial success back in the USSR didn’t require any new 
infrastructure investments, past what the Soviets already made for their domestic 
film industry. Finally, Western books were a staple on both the black market, and 
the official economy within the USSR since bringing in a book or reprinting it in 
Cyrillic does not take much effort. American fast food, however, required a 
substantial investment to make the operation profitable for all parties involved. The 
construction of bottling plants and restaurants must take into consideration many 
factors such as supply needs, employee training and recruitment, ownership and 
management agreements, distribution methods, possible locations, quality 
standards, pricing, and ruble inconvertibility. All of these factors presented a 
significant barrier to entry for any American food products. 
        By far the most significant obstacle for any American firm seeking to do 
business in the USSR was how to convert profits from Soviet rubles into usable 
Western currency (dollars/pounds). As a result of state policy and the centrally 
planned economy, the Soviet ruble was nearly impossible to convert into large 
amounts of hard currency.7 While an official exchange rate certainly existed, this 
rate was only usable for small transactions, mainly for tourists or foreign dignitaries 
visiting the USSR. Converting the millions of rubles American businesses were sure 
                                                        
7 Edgar L. Feige, "Perestroika and Ruble Convertibility." CATO Journal, Winter, 10, no. 3 (1991). 
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to make was simply not possible for a number of reasons. First, unlike currency in 
market economies, the Soviet ruble could not be used to freely purchase real or 
financial domestic assets, mainly because of the restrictions on private property in 
the USSR.8 Additionally, Soviet enterprises did not have unlimited discretion on how 
they could use the rubles they earned from internal profits on labor costs and 
purchasing needs, as all of this was closely monitored by state planning agencies. 
Money in the USSR functioned as an instrument of state policy, rather than as an 
article of free exchange, as Edgar Feige argues “It is the very restrictions placed on 
domestic conversions, between different forms of money and between money and 
domestic goods, services, and assets, that enables planners to accomplish material 
balances, production quotas, and planned allocations of factors and products.”9 In 
the early years of the Soviet regime, the government purposely designed the ruble 
as an inconvertible currency to ensure economic self-sufficiency and to protect 
Soviet industry from foreign competition. 10 Furthermore, it was illegal for 
individual Soviet citizens to own foreign currency, and illegal to move rubles outside 
of the country. This meant that there were no substantial quantities of rubles stored 
in any Western nation, thus no one was willing to convert the Soviet ruble. It is 
estimated that the Soviet Union only had about 25 to 30 billion dollars of hard 
                                                        
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Ibid. 
 
10 Ibid. 
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Western currency on hand to spend on foreign imports, and much of this was used 
to purchase grain and other agricultural products.11  
        Despite the numerous problems of doing business in the USSR, the Soviet 
market had a strong allure to some Western investors. If a foreign firm could figure 
a way around the ruble conversion issue, then the potential for profits were hard to 
ignore. For example, the competition between Caterpillar (the largest producer of 
earth moving equipment) and Komatsu demonstrates just how lucrative doing 
business in the Soviet Union could be. In 1980 Caterpillar’s sales were 8.6 billion 
dollars, three times higher than those of Komatsu, partly because their market share 
in the Soviet Union was 85 percent versus Komatsu’s 15 percent. By 1986 however, 
Caterpillar’s share of the Soviet market dropped to 15 percent because of US 
sanctions against the USSR, while Komatsu’s had expanded to 85 percent, which 
resulted in Caterpillar’s sales only amounting to 6.8 billion dollars that year.12 The 
possibility for profits was high due to the monopolistic nature of the centrally 
planned economy. If a Western business managed to successfully negotiate a deal 
with the government, it would face little to no competition from the Soviet state or 
other foreign companies. The PepsiCo deal is an excellent example of this, as it 
effectively managed to block Coca-Cola’s entry into the USSR up until the nation’s 
collapse in 1991. The size of the Soviet population was also a tempting factor for 
both PepsiCo and McDonald’s.13 Access to the world’s third largest market in terms 
                                                        
11 James L. Hecht, ed. Rubles and Dollars : Strategies For Doing Business In The Soviet Union (New 
York: Harper Business, 1991.) 3 
 
12 Ibid. 2 
 
9 
of population and GDP was a tempting opportunity. Furthermore, the Soviet 
population was one of the most educated in the world so finding skilled managers 
and engineers to help run local operations, theoretically was not a concern. Overall 
the Soviet Union was seen as an untapped “Wild West” of sorts, one where risks 
were high, but the potential rewards were well worth the investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
13 According to the 1979 Soviet census, the population of the country was 250 million people. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
PEPSI IN THE USSR: VODKA AND COLA DIPLOMACY 
 
         In 1959, PepsiCo, led by CEO Donald Kendall, initiated a deliberate campaign to 
introduce its famous cola into the Soviet Union. Donald Kendall’s efforts were 
groundbreaking, as Pepsi-Cola would become the first officially sanctioned 
American consumer product in the USSR. The introduction of Pepsi involved 
negotiations among the most powerful politicians of the day. Iconic figures of the 
Cold War era like Richard Nixon, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev all played 
an important role in bringing Pepsi to the communist nation. The Pepsi deal is 
emblematic of a few trends in Soviet economic politics. First, the Pepsi negotiations 
showcase the power of political connections in the USSR. Donald Kendall was lucky 
enough to have developed personal relationships with top Soviet leaders. Without 
their support the unforgiving Soviet bureaucracy might have stonewalled his project 
indefinitely. Second, the Pepsi deal exposes the Soviet Union’s willingness to 
compromise on ideological purity for the sake of pragmatism. What made the arrival 
of Pepsi so significant was that it succeeded during the early 1970s, a time of 
relative hostility to Western culture by the Soviet regime. Despite this unwelcoming 
attitude, the Pepsi deal offered the Soviets an opportunity to address some of their 
economic shortfalls and internal problems. Finally, Pepsi came at a time when the 
Soviet Union was retooling its manufacturing base from one based solely on heavy 
industry, into consumer-oriented production. Both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
governments prioritized material comforts for Soviet citizens. Pepsi provided not 
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only a source of revenue, but also a commodity that improved the material lives of 
average people.  
        The 1972 Pepsi deal was a massive bilateral trade agreement through which the 
USSR received the rights to sell Pepsi, while PepsiCo received the exclusive 
marketing rights to Stolichnaya Vodka. The nature of this deal had a significant 
impact on trade relations between the two countries, and was representative of 
Brezhnev’s and Nixon’s policy of détente. Pepsi also pioneered marketing and 
advertising in the USSR, a concept very foreign to most Soviet citizens. Between 
1972 and 1986 Pepsi was effectively able to secure the USSR as its own exclusive 
market. PepsiCo’s 14-year monopoly on cola would allow the company to expand in 
the USSR unchallenged by its main competitor, Coca-Cola. As the years went on 
Pepsi only gained more popularity in the USSR, and by 1990, PepsiCo had built 50 
production plants in most of the Soviet Unions major urban centers and acquired a 
significant market share of all beverage consumption in the country.14 
 
The 1959 Moscow Fair 
        The American National Exhibit was held in Moscow’s Sokolniki Park in the 
summer of 1959. For the American delegation, this was a chance to show off the 
advantages of capitalism by featuring modern American appliances, automobiles, 
and consumer products. The fair was designed to be a friendly cultural exchange 
and debate on the merits of socialism and capitalism. Earlier that year, the Soviets 
                                                        
14 Michael Parks, "Pepsi Push into Soviet Union a Textbook Case in Marketing." Los Angeles Times, 
June 26, 1988. 
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were allowed to hold a similar exhibition in New York City. The 1959 fair is best 
remembered for being the site of the famous “Kitchen Debate” where then Vice 
President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev debated the 
inherent superiority of their respective economic systems by demonstrating how 
easy they had made domestic life with the introduction of modern appliances. 
Nixon’s plan was to prove that if the Soviets simply had a taste of American 
prosperity, they would forget all about building communism. Nikita Khrushchev 
willing participated in this debate because he believed the Soviet Union was 
entering a new stage of communism. Providing the best standards of living for its 
citizens had become a chief priority for the Soviet regime. The Soviets had already 
proved their scientific superiority by launching the first satellite into orbit in 1957. 
Khrushchev was eager to prove that by applying the same principles of socialist 
science to the kitchen, the Soviets could “free women” to be more productive 
citizens. The socialist kitchen was designed for maximum efficiency and would be 
the conduit through which the fruits of socialism where be delivered into the 
home.15 The debate turned out to be an international sensation, and was the 
highlight of the whole fair. Donald Kendall however, was more interested in getting 
Khrushchev out of the kitchen and over to his Pepsi display, so the Soviet leader 
could sample the American products he railed against in the debate.  
        In 1959 Donald Kendall was still only the President of PepsiCo international, the 
department responsible for bringing Pepsi to foreign markets. Kendall saw the 1959 
Moscow fair as an excellent opportunity to open the Soviet market to foreign 
                                                        
15 Susan Reid, "Would You Like That Kitchen in Red?" Times Higher Education Supplement, (2003) no. 
1593. 
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investment. Back in the United State however, many of Kendall’s contemporaries 
and segments of the American press believed that doing business with the Soviets 
was unpatriotic and a poor business venture.16 Obviously Kendall disagreed, but this 
pessimism back home made the stakes that much higher, since Kendall’s board of 
directors would need something substantive from Kendall’s trip to validate their 
investment at the American exhibit in Moscow. The negativity back home was 
strong enough that six months before the Moscow fair Coca-Cola decided to decline 
its invitation to participate in the event, leaving Pepsi the only soft drink company to 
represent the United States.17  
        When in Moscow, Kendall would need to call upon the assistance of Vice 
President Richard Nixon to ensure his Pepsi exhibition was a success. PepsiCo had 
established a relationship with Richard Nixon in the 1950s, when the company had 
courted him and Senator Joe McCarthy as political allies in its domestic struggle 
against Coca-Cola.18 The night before the fair, Kendall contacted Vice President 
Nixon, and told him “I need to get a Pepsi in Khrushchev’s hands, because I’m in 
some trouble at home, because a lot of people think I’m wasting money, and I want 
to get something out of this.”19 Nixon responded by saying, “Don’t worry, I’ll bring 
                                                        
16 PepsiCo, Interview with Donald Kendall, Personal Interview, 2009, 
http://www.pepsico.com/Global-Sites/Russia/Moscow-Marks-50-Years.html (accessed April 20th, 
2013) 
 
17 Ludmilla Gricenko Wells, "" Brad's Drink" In the Soviet Union." In Marketing history--its many 
dimensions: proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Historical Research in Marketing and Marketing 
Thought, held April 19, 20, and 21, 1991 at the Kellogg Center of Michigan State University, p. 101. 
Michigan State University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1991. 
 
18 J C. Lewis and Harvey Yazijian. The Cola Wars (New York: Everest House, 1980). 88  
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Khrushchev by your exhibit tomorrow.”20  Richard Nixon did indeed deliver 
Khrushchev the following day to the Pepsi exhibit, where Kendall didn’t hesitate to 
make his move. Kendall handed Khrushchev two samples of Pepsi-Cola, one made in 
the United States and the other made on-site at the exhibit.  The reasoning behind 
having Khrushchev try two samples of Pepsi was to show him that Pepsi-Cola could 
be made just as well in the Soviet Union as it could be in the United States.  Not 
surprisingly, the often brash and flamboyant Khrushchev proclaimed that the 
sample made in Moscow was much tastier than the Pepsi from the United States. In 
reality, what this boiled down to was Khrushchev ridiculously boasting about the 
superiority of Soviet carbonated water, for the syrup and technique used to make 
the beverage were exactly the same as in the American-made sample. Khrushchev 
was so pleased with the drink that he handed out six cups to his surrounding 
entourage. Despite Khrushchev’s preference for the Soviet-made Pepsi, the event 
was a resounding success for Don Kendall and PepsiCo. A famous photograph was 
snapped (Fig. 1) at the event with a caption reading, “Khrushchev learns to be 
sociable with Pepsi,” which was a play on Pepsi’s marketing slogan of the 1950s, “Be 
sociable with Pepsi.” The photograph was circulated worldwide and earned PepsiCo 
a tremendous amount of positive media coverage. Kendall’s superiors back home 
were ecstatic, and the journey to bring Pepsi to the USSR had begun. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
19 PepsiCo, Interview with Donald Kendall 
 
20 Ibid 
15 
                                 
Figure 1. Nikita Khrushchev tasting Pepsi at the Moscow Fair 
        The 1959 Moscow fair was significant to PepsiCo for two reasons. First, it 
secured Donald Kendall’s rise to CEO within PepsiCo. In 1959 Kendall was still just 
head of PepsiCo international, but with his enormous publicity coup in the Soviet 
Union, Kendall’s agenda and vision were the ones that prevailed over the skeptics 
and potential competitors back home. Kendall’s drive to strengthen international 
relations with the Soviet Union, and make a few dollars doing it, would be the key 
ingredient needed to bring the first sanctioned American business into the USSR. 
The second important impact of the Khrushchev “sip heard round the world” was 
that it cemented the friendship of Donald Kendall and Richard Nixon.21 Without a 
powerful political ally like Richard Nixon, Kendall would surely have failed in his 
mission. The negotiations to bring Pepsi into the USSR took place between people in 
the highest levels of government, and considerable lobbying would be needed to 
convince the American Congress to approve the necessary trade treaties. 
 
                                                        
21 J C Lewis, and Harvey Yazijian. 93 
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From 1959 to 1971 
        There was no doubt that the Moscow Fair was an enormous success for PepsiCo 
and Donald Kendall personally, but turning Khrushchev’s enjoyment of Pepsi into a 
tangible business deal would prove to be a bit more challenging.  The first major 
stumbling block encountered by Kendall and PepsiCo was Richard Nixon’s 1960 
presidential campaign. Before the infamous 1960 televised Presidential debates, 
Richard Nixon enjoyed a slight margin in the polls and was generally expected to 
win the election over Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy, by riding on the 
coattails of Dwight Eisenhower’s immense popularity.22 The first debate turned out 
to be a disaster for Nixon, as he appeared pale, nervous, and sickly, while Kennedy 
was tanned, vibrant and attractive. Nixon made the mistake of campaigning right up 
to the day of the televised debate and refused to wear makeup on air, Kennedy on 
the other hand was rested and well prepared for the new medium. Nixon’s poor 
appearance was further accentuated by the fact that the day before the debate, CBS 
studio crews installed new tubes into their cameras, making the broadcast quality 
sharper. The debate had gone so poorly for Nixon that his own mother called him a 
few minutes afterwards and asked if he was feeling sick.23  The press was abuzz the 
day following the debate and declared Kennedy the winner.24 The power of 
                                                        
22 According to Gallup’s historical data, Dwight Eisenhower enjoyed an average approval rating of 
65% throughout his eight years in office. In 1960, just before the presidential election, Eisenhower’s 
approval rating was at a very respectable 70%. Furthermore after the famous televised debates 
Richard Nixon dropped an average of 3 percentage points in the polls. The final count on election 
night was much closer, with Kennedy winning with just .1% of the popular vote. 
 
23 Alan Schroeder, Presidential Debates: Forty Years of High-Risk TV. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000). 7-9 
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television had made is mark on American history, and by extension PepsiCo’s and 
the Soviet Union’s history as well. Richard Nixon ended up losing the 1960 election, 
which left the campaign to bring American business into the USSR in a state of 
limbo. Donald Kendall had no ties to John F. Kennedy, and as a result the idea of 
Pepsi in the USSR would be put on the back burner. 
        In 1962 Richard Nixon ran for governor of California, and was again defeated, 
this time by Democrat Pat Brown. Despite his two humiliating political losses, 
Donald Kendall knew that Richard Nixon was a valuable ally and offered him a 
position at PepsiCo international, which Nixon turned down, preferring instead to 
practice law in New York.25  The years between 1963 and 1968 were key to 
resurrecting Nixon’s political career. Nixon’s new law firm took on PepsiCo as one of 
its main clients, allowing Kendall and Nixon to maintain their close ties. During 
these in-between years Kendall repaid his debt from Moscow by investing in 
Richard Nixon’s political comeback and transforming him from an ardent anti-
communist into a more appealing and open-minded candidate.26 Kendall’s 
investment would pay off as Nixon won the 1968 presidential election. Additionally, 
Donald Kendall assumed the position of president and CEO of all PepsiCo during 
these years (1965 to be specific) allowing his vision and agenda for the company to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
24 Ibid. 10 
 
25 J C Lewis and Harvey Yazijian, The Cola Wars. 110-111 
 
26 Ibid. 192 
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be carried out.27 With Kendall’s ascension to CEO and Nixon back in charge of the 
White House, the negotiations to bring Pepsi into the USSR would begin once again.  
        The winds of political change were not exclusive to the United States, as the 
Soviet Union experienced its own transition in leadership. In 1964 General 
Secretary Nikita Khrushchev was ousted and replaced by the more conservative 
Leonid Brezhnev.  Thus the success Kendall had enjoyed in Moscow was now 
destroyed, because the primary players of the 1959 Moscow Fair lost their political 
clout. Interestingly enough, however, the Brezhnev regime was not entirely 
resistant to the idea of cooperation with the West.  Brezhnev’s government often 
vacillated from condemnation to begrudging acceptance of “bourgeois” cultural 
imports, and his government was often willing to comprise on ideological purity for 
the sake of profits. This dynamic is illustrated quite well in the types of films the 
Brezhnev government chose to import for Soviet audiences. After the 1950s official 
Soviet film critics often panned Indian movies for being corrupted by the negative 
influences of Hollywood, but the Soviet Union’s film import agency 
(Soveksportfil’m) continued to import these tainted foreign films in great numbers 
simply because they could be relied upon to sell tickets.28 Soviet officials in Bombay 
complained that Moscow only selected popular films and ignored the ones that had 
true social value as commentaries on bourgeois oppression: “it is a obvious fact that 
films with obvious commercial potential are given first preference by selectors.”29 
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This willingness to compromise would be a necessary virtue for Pepsi’s introduction 
into the USSR, as the Soviet Union stood to make a substantial amount of money 
from licensed Pepsi sales. 
        The political volatility on both sides was the primary reason a trade deal was 
not reached sooner. There were effectively no business negotiations from 1960 to 
1971. The first trade delegation to the Soviet Union was only sent in 1971. By 1972 
Pepsi had achieved success with a 10-year exclusivity deal, and would begin 
shipping Pepsi to the USSR in 1973. When both sides finally met, the PepsiCo 
negotiations actually went remarkably quickly (about 11 months). 
 
A Deal Is Reached 
        In 1971 Richard Nixon agreed to send the Department of Commerce on a trade 
mission to the Soviet Union. Accompanying the American delegation was Richard 
Nixon’s close friend and business associate, Donald Kendall. The original trade 
mission did not have the set goal of bringing Pepsi to the USSR, but Kendall knew 
that this was an opportunity he could not waste. During the meetings, Donald 
Kendall approached Premier of the Soviet Union Alexei Kosygin and impressed him 
with a radio shaped like a Pepsi can.30 That same day Kendall made his pitch to sell 
Pepsi to the Soviets. The sales pitch worked like a charm, mostly because it was 
mutually beneficial for all parties involved. The initial proposal called for a Pepsi for 
currency exchange, but this was later modified due to the inconvertibility of the 
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Soviet ruble, a problem major problem McDonald’s would also encounter in its 
dealings with the Soviets. 
        The high-ranking Soviet bureaucrats who met with the American trade mission 
were particularly interested in the Pepsi for vodka deal because of the Soviet 
Union’s chronic problems with alcoholism. In the preceding year the Brezhnev 
government began an anti-alcoholism campaign in an attempt to improve the 
overall health of the population and increase the productivity of the Soviet 
workforce.31 The Pepsi deal was the perfect solution to their problems. First, it 
would help mitigate the lost revenue the government normally received from its 
state vodka monopoly. Vodka sales had traditionally been a significant source of 
profit for the Soviet government, denoted by fact that vodka made up 19.4 percent 
of state and cooperative sales, and accounted for up to 39% of all retail trade in the 
early 1930s.32 It is difficult to get precise alcohol sales data for the 1960s and 70s 
because the sales figures of alcohol were combined with other foodstuffs, but it is 
estimated that during this period alcohol accounted for 15-20% of disposable house 
hold incomes.33 The anti-alcoholism campaign was sure to negatively impact 
domestic vodka consumption, but by selling vodka abroad to Americans the Soviets 
would not be adversely damaging their budget by crusading against alcoholism. 
Second, and perhaps just as important, the deal would provide the Soviet population 
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with a tasty and glamorous non-alcoholic alternative to vodka. While the Soviet 
Union already made some of its own carbonated soft drinks, Pepsi was a guaranteed 
winner because there was no doubt about its ability to turn a profit. Pepsi was a 
famous American brand, and could be expected to sell well on the basis of its novelty 
and reputation. This Western product would also help suppress some of the 
negative sentiment from the Soviet the population, which would inevitably result 
from the anti-alcoholism campaign. 
        The groundbreaking deal was signed on November 16th between A. I. Nikolayev 
and Donald Kendall in the presence of various Soviet officials, including Alexei 
Kosygin. The specifics of the contract granted Pepsi ten years of exclusivity rights on 
the distribution of Stolichnaya Vodka in the American market, and in return Pepsi 
would be the sole supplier of cola-flavored soft drinks to the Soviet Union. An 
ingenuous method was organized to bypass the inconvertibility of the Soviet ruble. 
Under the agreement, the Soviet Union would earn American dollars from the sale of 
Stolichnaya Vodka in the United States, which it would then use to purchase 
concentrated Pepsi-Cola syrup.34 The concentrated syrup would be shipped to 
officially sanctioned Pepsi bottling plants, where it would then be mixed with Soviet 
carbonated water to produce the patented soft drink. In this way, the amount of 
Pepsi syrup the Soviets could buy was directly tied to how much Stolichnaya Vodka 
they could produce and sell in the United States. Part of the deal on PepsiCo’s end 
was the acquisition of Monsieur Henri Wines Ltd for 26 million dollars, which 
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already distributed small quantities of Stolichnaya Vodka in the West. The price of a 
bottle of Stolichnaya Vodka in the United States before the 1972 Pepsi deal was 
about 8 dollars and 50 cents. Donald Kendall hoped to bring that down to about 2 
dollars by lobbying the U.S. Congress to strike down trade tariffs on Soviet goods.35 
The secret formula for Pepsi was never released to any Soviet officials, as very few 
people knew it in the United States. The estimated value of the deal was place at 
“several million U.S. dollars,” with an additional investment of 1 million dollars by 
Pepsi for the construction of a bottling plant in the Black Sea resort town of 
Novorossisk.36  
        The Novorossisk bottling plant would be the nexus of Pepsi production in the 
USSR for the next several years. PepsiCo would cover all construction costs as well 
as provide all of the equipment; engineers, and training needed to staff the complex, 
but most of the employees would be local Soviet workers. Construction of the 
bottling plant would take several months, with the first bottle expected to roll off 
the line in the beginning of 1974. The factory was equipped to produce 3 million 
cases of Pepsi-Cola per year, equivalent to about 72 million bottles, with most of this 
output going to service several Black Sea resort towns and select Moscow stores.37 
Donald Kendall commented that 3 million cases per year was nowhere near enough 
to supply a country the size of the USSR, pointing out that PepsiCo sold about 800 
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million cases in the United States alone. Kendall was optimistic that within five 
years the production could be increased to about 20 million cases of Pepsi per year, 
granted the Soviets could provide the necessary vodka.38  
        Interestingly enough, the types of bottles used in the factory would not be 
Pepsi’s iconic grooved design. There was a growing fear among many Soviet officials 
that Soviet citizens would not return the bottles for reuse if a Western bottle design 
were utilized.39 It was believed that the American style Pepsi bottle would be 
considered exotic, and treated as a collector’s item because of its novelty. The Soviet 
Union was already struggling to keep glass bottle production in line with demand; 
therefore if people hoarded the glass bottles, Pepsi production in the USSR would 
come to a halt. To solve this problem, the type of bottle used in the production was a 
standard Soviet .33 liter bottle (Fig. 2), which was used for most Soviet soft drinks of 
the time.40 The Soviet bottle would be wrapped in Pepsi’s label, only written in 
Cyrillic letters. People were encouraged to keep the foil label, but return the glass 
bottle for recycling. The bottle issue is emblematic of Soviet society on two levels. 
First it highlights the constant deficits of almost every good within the Soviet Union, 
and second, it proves just how coveted Western goods were in the USSR. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of the Soviet and American Pepsi bottles 
        The press coverage and reaction within the two superpowers was somewhat 
uneven. The contract was greeted with considerable excitement in the United States, 
where most major news organization gave the event considerable attention. The 
Wall Street Journal, not surprisingly, had very strong coverage of the business deal, 
as well as the New York Times. The WSJ’s reporters were even brazen enough to ask 
Donald Kendall whether his friendship with Richard Nixon had any influence on the 
deal.41 Kendall dodged the question by saying, “I don’t know that that would have to 
do with it,” further adding “Pepsi is sold in 130 countries, and I have opened a lot of 
those markets… I have been selling Pepsi Cola for a long time.”42 Obviously Kendall’s 
close relationship with Nixon was the primary reason the deal happened in the first 
place, and it is the reason Pepsi would continue to prosper in the USSR. Within the 
Soviet Union, the contract was given limited publicity.  The Soviet Union’s primary 
newspaper, Pravda, only mentioned the bilateral trade deal in its general 
announcement sections, and most writers were given little leeway for any kind of 
opinion journalism. Coverage in Izvestiia was a bit stronger, as the newspaper 
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actually reported on the story a few times between 1972-73. Finally, some of the 
smaller Soviet media outlets like Literaturnaia Gazeta had a few words about the 
negotiations, but the coverage was not exceptionally deep.43 
        A particular highlight of Soviet press coverage came from Izvestiia’s interview 
with Donald Kendall, in which he was asked to give his opinion on a variety of 
topics. Kendall stressed that the Pepsi deal was much more than just an exchange of 
beverages, but instead should be considered a starting point for improved relations 
between the USSR and United States. Kendall predicted that American businessmen 
would be more willing to brave the Soviet market after this deal.44 For the bulk of 
the interview, Kendall appealed to Soviet readers by explaining how critical it was 
that the American Congress lower import tariffs on Soviet made goods, not just for 
Pepsi’s sake but for the improvement of East-West relations.45 
        Moscow’s reluctance to over-publicize the Pepsi deal can be attributed to their 
fear that the contract might be interpreted as a capitulation to the West or a 
compromise of ideology. Western music, films, and literature were very popular, 
and generated considerable profit for the state. However, Western goods in the 
1960s and 1970s were also believed to corrupt the moral core of good socialists.46 If 
the Soviet regime looked as if it was promoting foreign goods from its Cold War 
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rival, it might have reflected poorly on its credibility with some of the more 
conservative elements within the government. 
 
Resistance 
        The signing of the 1972 contract was only the first step in making Pepsi-Cola 
successful in the Soviet Union.  Since the amount of concentrated Pepsi syrup that 
the Soviet Union could purchase was directly related to Stolichnaya Vodka sales in 
the United States, Don Kendall needed a way to maximize the amount of Soviet 
vodka sold back home. In 1972 Stolichnaya was the only Soviet made vodka on the 
American market, and was seen as a top-shelf spirit with a hefty price tag of about 9 
dollars per bottle. The key to making Stolichnaya a more accessible brand was to 
decrease its relatively high price. The reason Soviet vodka was so expensive was the 
trade tariffs imposed by the U.S. Congress on Soviet made goods. Therefore, the best 
way to reduce the price of Stolichnaya was to grant the Soviet Union most favored 
nation status (MFN), thus eliminating any trade barriers between the two nations. 
To solve this problem Kendall would again rely on the political clout of his former 
lawyer and current friend, Richard Nixon. 
        In 1974 President Nixon submitted the Trade Reform Act to Congress in an 
attempt to harmonize trade relations with the Soviet Union. This bill was a powerful 
piece of legislation designed with the intention of streamlining foreign trade deals 
by affording the President wide reaching powers in international business 
negotiations. Among many other things, Title VI of the bill would permit the 
executive, for a period of 5 years, the ability to eliminate tariff and non-tariff trade 
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barriers by granting any country most favored nation status.47 By the 1970s about 
130 nations around the world enjoyed MFN status.48 The only countries that were 
currently not bilateral trading partners with the U.S. were Eastern bloc countries, 
with the exception of Poland and Yugoslavia.49 Nixon saw MFN status as a 
centerpiece of his détente policy, since Soviet tariffs could be twice as high as those 
placed on French or German imports.50  The Trade Reform Act was the answer to 
Don Kendall’s dilemma. Unfortunately for him, the bill ended up embroiled in a 
human rights debate in the United States Congress. 
        The problems for Kendall and Nixon began when Senator Henry Jackson (D-
Washington), a vocal anti-Soviet spokesman, caught wind of Soviet intentions to 
impose an emigration tax on Russian Jews.51 As a member of the Senate Ways and 
Means committee, Senator Jackson was able to add a provision into the bill that 
would deny any nation MFN status if it prevented the emigration of its own 
citizens.52 Nixon vehemently opposed the provision on the grounds that it would 
damage the fragile détente he had worked so hard to achieve, and even threatened 
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to veto his own bill if the provision was not removed.53  Kendall also lobbied against 
the bill by recruiting dozens of corporate leaders to his side.54 Even the Soviet Union 
did its part to help with the passage of the bill (without Jackson’s provision) by 
agreeing to grant MFN status to the United States, guaranteeing to purchase a 
substantial amount of American goods, paying for its purchases in American dollars 
or other hard currencies, and, finally, agreeing to settle its World War II lend-lease 
debt. Despite the lobbying efforts of Nixon, Kendall, and the USSR the issue met with 
further complications, when famous Soviet dissidents Alexander Solzhenitsyn and 
Andrei Sakharov turned the bill and its anti-Soviet provision into a general 
discussion of civil rights in the USSR.55  
        To make matters even worse, many American-Jewish groups who were angered 
by the 1972 contract, which resulted in a general boycott of PepsiCo products. A 
women’s Zionist organization complained that Pepsi had no bottling plants in Israel 
because of its lucrative business deals with Arab states.56 The Union of Councils for 
Soviet Jews put out a press release attacking PepsiCo for its disrespectful business 
practices and calling for a general boycott of Pepsi, stating “free people before free 
trade.” They further argued “It is immoral to extend trade benefits, especially in 
luxury commodities, while the Soviet government continues to violate the 
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fundamental human rights of freedom of emigration and free exercise of religion.”57 
This boycott was terrible publicity for Kendall and his company, and the protests 
ultimately affected the final legislation. When all of the dust had settled, Congress 
passed the Trade Reform Act in 1975, but granted the Soviet only limited MFN 
status. 
        What is fascinating about this ordeal is just how reversed the Pepsi and 
McDonald’s situation were when it came to dealing with the Soviet regime. As the 
next chapter will show, McDonald’s-Canada CEO George Cohen would suffer years of 
endless red tape in the morass of the Soviet government. His negotiations were long, 
expensive, and painful because of the Soviets’ unwillingness to help him. Most of 
Cohen’s problems came from the nature of Russian bureaucracy. By contrast, 
Donald Kendall’s problems with bureaucracy and ideology stemmed from the 
American government and private citizen’s groups. The Soviets were even willing to 
make concessions for the sake of the deal by paying back Lend-Lease debts, which 
amounted to about 722 million dollars.58 It is no surprise that Donald Kendall 
predicted his greatest challenge would be the American Congress in his interview 
with Izvestiia.59 
        Despite the relative smoothness of negotiations between the Soviets and 
Kendall in the establishing a bilateral trade agreement, not everyone within the 
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Soviet regime was thrilled about Pepsi coming to the USSR. Donald Kendall recalls 
that two months after signing the 1972 deal, he was contacted by Alexei Kosygin, 
who informed him that he was needed back in Russia.60 Upon his arrival, Kendall 
was told that the Minister of Food was quite unhappy that an American company 
was setting up shop in the USSR. Kosygin said to Kendall “I can tell the Food Minister 
what to do, but I want you to take him on a trip to the United States and show him 
why we should be doing business.”61 The trip to the United States started off cold, 
but eventually the Food Minister warmed up to Kendall after he played a practical 
joke on the tour guide of a Chicago Pepsi plant by switching ties with the Food 
minister. The tour guide ended up addressing the Food Minister as Kendall, which 
amused the Soviet official to no end. After this point the trip was a jolly and friendly 
affair. The Soviet Minister realized the Americans were not the scary beasts he had 
imagined, and was more than happy to be doing business with Pepsi.62 The fact that 
Kendall considers this to be one of the more standout cases of resistance by the 
Soviets, is certainly telling of the limited ideological resistance he encountered in the 
Soviet Union. 
 
Expansion 
        Stolichnaya Vodka was a massive hit in the U.S. market, and not even Donald 
Kendall could have predicted how well Americans eventually received the Soviet 
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liquor. In 1973, when Stolichnaya was first imported into the United States in 
significant quantities it sold 30,000 cases, by 1978 it was selling 200,000 cases per 
year.63 These numbers were considered a resounding success, when factoring in the 
high price of a single bottle. By 1980, it was estimated that 1 million cases were 
being sold per year, making Stolichnaya the second best selling vodka in the United 
States.64  Part of this commercial success was generated by Donald Kendall’s 
aggressive advertising campaign, which stressed the fact that Stolichnaya was the 
only authentic Russian vodka available on the American market. Kendall’s ads 
frequently attacked imposter Russian vodkas such as Smirnoff, which was made in 
Hartford Connecticut, as opposed to Stolichnaya, which was made in Leningrad (Fig. 
3).  The sales generated by the vodka in the U.S. were significant enough that in 
1978 Pepsi announced it would increase the number of bottling plants it had in the 
USSR from 2 to 10. Distribution of the soda would now be expanded out from the 
Black Sea resort towns of Novorossisk and Yevpatoria, to major urban centers like 
Moscow, Leningrad, Tallinn, Alma-Ata, Kiev, Tashkent, Novosibirsk, and Sukhumi.65 
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Figure 3. 1974 Ad stressing the authenticity of Stolichnaya 
        Stolichnaya’s success in the United States was surpassed only by Pepsi’s 
popularity in the Soviet market. Pepsi was originally supposed to be sold for 15 
kopecks per bottle, but ended up costing 40 kopeks per bottle or the equivalent of 
about 52 cents in 1974.66 This relatively steep price for a Soviet citizen proved no 
deterrent to indulging in this Western luxury. In the early to mid 1970s when Pepsi 
was available only in the Black Sea region it was a hot commodity that stores in the 
area could not hold on their shelves for more than a day. Privileged children all over 
Sochi were seen happily consuming the beverage. The New York Times reported an 
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incident in Sochi where a group of Soviet youths brought Pepsi from a local store 
with them into a restaurant, when the other patrons saw the boys with Pepsi they 
began ordering in it from their waiters, only to be told the restaurant does not carry 
the soft drink.67 By 1980, 73 distinctive Pepsi kiosks lined the streets of Moscow in 
subways and other traffic hotspots, each of which sold an average of 4,000 bottles 
per day.68 In the early 1980s the Soviet Union was producing about 15 million cases 
of Pepsi-Cola for its internal market, with an annual income of 182.5 million dollars 
per year.69 Pepsi was becoming a significant source of revenue for the Soviet state, 
an income stream that would only increase as the number of bottling plants climbed 
from 10 to 26 over the course of the 1980s. 
        Donald Kendall’s advertising strategy wasn’t only limited to selling Stolichnaya 
Vodka in the United States. In 1988 Pepsi became the first American firm to 
advertise on Soviet television. PepsiCo planned to air four 30-second ads on Soviet 
television one week before a major summit meeting between Ronald Reagan and 
Mikhail Gorbachev.70 The commercials would first air on a program called “Pozner 
in America”, where Vladimir Pozner, through a Satellite link between Moscow and 
Seattle, would speak with Americans on subjects ranging from their attitudes about 
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the Soviet Union to family life in the United States.71 PepsiCo expected about 150 
million Soviet citizens to tune into the broadcast. The ads would begin running on 
May 17th and continue through the 21st. Two of the ads featured a young Michael 
Jackson performing with a Pepsi; they were titled “Backstage” and “Concert”.  These 
ads featuring Jackson were already running in the United States and would simply 
be dubbed in Russian for the Soviet audience. The third commercial titled “Float”, 
was the standout, as it featured an American astronaut and Soviet cosmonaut 
struggling to reach a bottle of Pepsi in a zero gravity environment. The final ad, 
called “Guitar” , showed off the American country rock scene with Pepsi as a 
sponsor.  
        The commercials were seen as a favorable sign back in the United States that 
the Soviet Union was finally accepting capitalism. Ed Wierzbowsik of Global America 
argued that “it is very capitalistic”, and “If a communist country ever made a step 
closer to capitalism, this it.72 Soviet journalist Sergei Skvortsov who co-produced 
Vladimir Pozner’s show, defended the move by saying that “The series is a quality 
program which can be sold to a lot of people, including people in the West” adding 
“Making a quality product and selling it all over the world is consistent with 
Socialism”73 Whether or not Skvortsov’s argument holds any water is certainly 
debatable, but the fact of the matter was, the commercials were only a trial run, and 
the Soviets were not counting on Pepsi’s money to air the broadcast. 
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        By 1989 demand for Pepsi in the USSR far exceeded Stolichnaya sales in the 
American market. Since the amount of Pepsi syrup the Soviets could purchase was 
directly linked to vodka sales in the United States, a new deal would have to be 
signed to allow the Soviets to buy more syrup. The new contract that followed was 
perhaps one of the most bizarre business transactions in modern history. In 1990, 
PepsiCo and the Soviet Union signed their largest deal to date, worth 3 billion 
dollars.74 Some of the more mundane clauses of the deal included things like 
expanding the Soviet Union’s bottling network from 26 to 50 plants, and increasing 
the exportation of Stolichnaya vodka to the U.S. By far the most interesting 
stipulation of the new deal was how the Soviets planned to pay for the extra syrup 
they would be importing.  Since Soviet rubles were still considered an inconvertible 
currency the Soviet government paid for the beverage with 10 commercial tankers 
and freighters ranging from 28,000 tons to 65,000 tons each.75 Also included in the 
deal were 17 Soviet attack submarines, 1 cruiser, 1 frigate, and 1 destroyer.76 After 
the deal, PepsiCo would become the 7th largest naval power in the world. Since Pepsi 
was not planning on invading any foreign countries, most of the ships were sold to 
the U.S. government or broken down for metal. Donald Kendall joked, “We're 
disarming the Soviet Union faster than you are”, when discussing the deal with a 
Bush administration foreign advisor.77 Donald Kendall later commented, “President 
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Bush and President Gorbachev should during their meetings have Pepsi and 
Stolichnaya on the table to remind them what good agreements are.”78 Mikhail 
Gorbachev welcomed the expansion of Pepsi into the USSR because he saw the new 
contract as an excellent way of expanding the variety of foods and beverages Soviet 
citizens had available to them.79  
         In 1987 the Gorbachev government passed its joint venture decree, which 
allowed foreign companies to own up to 49% of a business in the USSR. This law 
was part of Gorbachev’s overall policy of perestroika, and was designed to 
encourage Western investment in the ailing economy, while simultaneously 
ensuring that the government still retained the majority of shares in any particular 
foreign enterprise.  This legislation would prove to be critical for the ambitions of 
both PepsiCo and McDonald’s. Towards the late 1980s, PepsiCo was looking to 
diversify its product line in the Soviet Union by opening fast food restaurants. Pizza 
Hut, a PepsiCo subsidiary since 1977, was America’s most popular pizza franchise in 
the 1980s.80 In 1987 PepsiCo signed a contract with the Soviets to open two Pizza 
Hut locations in Moscow. The deal was initially intended to be a trial run, to test the 
feasibility of operating an American fast food restaurant in the USSR, under a dual 
ownership model.  
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        PepsiCo’s plan called for two restaurants, one of which would accept rubles and 
the other only dollars or other hard currency. The ruble-denominated restaurant 
would be used to pay for the operating expense within the Soviet Union, while the 
other would be used to turn a profit in American dollars.81 Furthermore, PepsiCo 
would import some of the ingredients and flavorings necessary to prepare the pizza, 
thus circumventing the Soviet Union’s unreliable agricultural sector. 
        What makes this event even more interesting is that just three days prior the 
Pizza Hut contract, McDonald’s officials had concluded talks to open their own 
restaurant in Moscow.  In a sense this kicked off a fast food race, as both companies 
no doubt wanted to claim the title of first American restaurant in the USSR. In his 
memoirs George Cohen comments that one of his primary motivators for bringing 
McDonald’s to the USSR was a run-in he had with Donald Kendall in a Moscow hotel 
lobby in the early 1980s. Cohen recalls that Donald Kendall was arrogant, and full of 
himself for having succeeded with his Pepsi deal in the early 1970s. Kendall’s 
condescending attitude left a big impact on Cohen, and beating him in the restaurant 
department must have been a priority in 1987. Cohen writes about his meeting with 
Kendall 
I stared at him. He was rude. He was cold. He was pompous and self-
important. I stood there, in the lobby of the Sovincentr, and felt 
something shift inside me. It came right out of the blue, at a movement 
when I least expected it. You could call it determination. I knew then that 
I was going to keep digging and driving. It was something quite 
unpredictable. You could call it optimism82 
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        By the late 1980s the Soviet press coverage of PepsiCo’s endeavors in the USSR 
had become more extensive. Izvestiia reported on the strict quality standards 
PepsiCo employed in operating its Pizza Hut restaurants.  The Soviet newspaper 
interviewed Andrew Rafalat, the director of Pizza Hut’s Eastern Europe operations, 
who showered the Soviet Union with praise and platitudes, and stressed that Pizza 
Hut’s policy offered speed of service, cleanliness, and delicious food, that tastes the 
same no matter where it is made.83 The article also indicated that the restaurant 
would allow take-out orders, a concept that was quite foreign to most Russians, with 
five different types of pizzas available for Soviet citizens to take home and enjoy.84 
According to the article some of the basic ingredients for the pizza would be 
produced in the Soviet Union, but the equipment for the restaurants would be 
brought in from the United States, much as PepsiCo had done sixteen years earlier 
with their Novorossisk bottling plant. 
         Unfortunately for PepsiCo, they opened the Pizza Hut restaurants during the 
death throes of the Soviet Union and had not been well protected against the 
economic uncertainty of the crumbling nation. Pizza Hut’s first major stumbling 
block resulted from failing to screen all employees for venereal disease, and had to 
be temporarily shut down.85 Pizza Hut also failed to set up special farms to supply 
its restaurants, a mistake that would eventually lead to supply shortages. By 
December 30th of that year, Pizza Hut had to raise prices by 50 percent due to 
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produce scarcity and volatility within the Soviet economy, although Cohen also 
eventually had to double the price of his Big Mac.86 By 1991, the political situation in 
the Soviet Union was so unstable that Andrew Rafalat (president of Pizza Hut in 
Eastern Europe) had a suitcase packed and ready to go just in case he needed to 
quickly exit the USSR, and most of his valuables were left in London for safe 
keeping.87 
 
Conclusion 
                PepsiCo’s success in the USSR was astonishing in view of the political 
climate the company was working in. In 1972 the Vietnam War was still raging and 
Western imports where viewed with considerable suspicion by the Soviet state. 
Despite this, a deal was reached after only eleven months of direct negations. 
PepsiCo became the first officially sanctioned company to enter the Soviet Union, 
and over the course of the 1970s slowly expanded its beverage empire. Even the 
turbulent 1980s, with the American boycott of the Olympics and the Soviet Invasion 
of Afghanistan could not slow down the rate at which Pepsi was sold in the USSR. 
What makes the whole deal even more remarkable was how well Americans 
responded to Stolichnaya vodka. Kendall’s failure to get the Soviets unrestricted 
MFN status proved to be only a slight inconvenience in the end, as the high price of 
the vodka was actually used as a selling point. What we see from the Pepsi deal is a 
form of Soviet pragmatism, which often manifested itself when the government was 
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faced with having to choose profits over ideological integrity. The Pepsi contract had 
too much to offer the Russians, for them to refused the deal. Besides the revenue the 
deal brought in for the state, it also allowed the Soviets to export a cultural product 
of their own. The Pepsi deal even saw a brief political alliance between Kendall, 
Nixon, and the USSR against the American Congress, when they all lobbied against 
Senator Jackson’s anti-Soviet provision. This strange alliance between three very 
unlikely parties shows just how critical it was to have friends in high places when 
dealing with the Soviets. The lack of political contacts was an issue that plagued 
George Cohen when he first began negotiations with the Soviet government for the 
establishment of a McDonald’s restaurant. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
MCDONDALD’S IN THE USSR: REVOLUTIONIZING SERVICE CULTURE 
 
         Pizza Hut was not the first American fast food restaurant to open in the Soviet 
Union; it was beaten by McDonald’s. Amid considerable pageantry and commotion 
McDonald’s managed to open its doors on January 31st, 1990, a full eight months 
earlier than Pizza Hut. Similar to the Pepsi deal, the introduction of McDonald’s into 
the Soviet Union grew out of a crusade by a single executive named George Cohen. 
Unlike Donald Kendall, George Cohen did not have the assistance of the American 
President or any high level political contacts within the USSR when he first began 
his quest. Cohen’s business deal was initially much less tempting for the Soviet 
regime because it lacked the immediate benefits the Pepsi deal brought with it. The 
fourteen-year struggle to open a McDonald’s in the “worker’s paradise” was 
characterized by disappointing failures, wasted fortunes, stifling bureaucracy, 
ground breaking innovation, and even some blind luck. However, much like the 
PepsiCo case, McDonald’s in the USSR is an account of one man’s undying 
determination to succeed when most people told him he would fail.   
        In many ways the arrival of McDonald’s into the Soviet Union represented so 
much more than just American fast food, or even American popular culture. The 
golden arches of Moscow became inextricably linked to Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy 
of perestroika. To Gorbachev and by extension the Russian people, McDonald’s was 
the harbinger of an economic revolution that would help reform some of the most 
backward aspects of Soviet society. When Soviet citizens queued for hours outside 
the restaurant, they weren’t there for just a fatty hamburger and greasy fries. They 
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braved the Russian winter to catch a brief glimpse of the possible future perestroika 
and glasnost held for their nation.  The problems and naysayers were never in short 
supply when it came to opening the restaurant. At times the project seemed to be 
buried under a mountain of red tape, one from which it would never escape.  Cohen 
was forced to deal with problems that Donald Kendall never encountered in his 
1972 deal. In fact, when Cohen was in the Soviet Union pitching his idea to any 
Soviet bureaucrat who would listen, he found that many of them didn’t even know 
what a hamburger was. Moreover, Cohen’s first foray into the USSR ended in 
complete failure, in contrast to Kendall’s grand success with Nikita Khrushchev at 
the 1959 Moscow Fair. Initially, Cohen never had any ambitions to carry his 
company to foreign soil but all that would change on one fateful day.  
 
Blind Chance 
        The project to bring McDonald’s into the USSR began on chance encounter 
between President of McDonald’s-Canada, George Cohen, and the Soviet Olympic 
delegation at the 1976 Montreal games. Some time before the Olympic games Cohen 
received a phone call from the Canadian Department of External Affairs asking him 
if they could use some of McDonalds’ luxury coach buses to ferry around foreign 
dignitaries.  Cohen was initially hesitant to loan the buses to the Canadian 
government, considering them for company use only, but in the end he decided that 
he was doing his country a service by providing them the vehicles. 88 This seemingly 
mundane act of patriotism would end up changing George Cohen’s life forever. As 
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compensation for the use of his company’s bus, the Canadian Olympic committee 
granted Cohen and his family tickets to the 1976 Olympic games. While attending a 
track and field event one late summer afternoon, Cohen spotted his company buses 
being used to shuttle the Soviet delegation, this particular group of Soviet officials 
was in charge of planning the upcoming 1980 Moscow Olympics.  On the spur of the 
moment Cohen said to his wife, “Lets go meet the Russians.”89  Cohen casually struck 
up a conversation with the Soviet delegation, which he impressed with his 
unconventional hamburger shaped business card. After enjoying a brief 
conversation with the Soviets, he was rudely interrupted by a Canadian official who 
objected to Cohen’s presence, and informed him that all communication with the 
Soviet delegation must observe proper protocol and be pursued through proper 
channels.90 Cohen was a straightforward, no-nonsense businessman, who had little 
patience for bureaucrats (a patience he would later be forced to painstakingly 
develop from his dealings in the USSR). Cohen’s response to the bureaucrat, “My 
friend, protocol is I own this bus,” this response instantaneously endeared Cohen 
with the Soviet delegates who were quite used to dealing with bureaucrats telling 
them what they could and could not do.  As a result of his handling of the situation, 
Cohen was invited to dinner by the Soviet delegation. Cohen happily took them up 
on their offer, but not before suggesting an additional pit stop, he invited them to 
lunch at one his McDonald’s restaurants. 
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        The Soviet officials were enamored of what they experienced in Cohen’s 
restaurant. The food was delicious, the service was efficient, and the facilities were 
clean, adjectives one would rarely use to describe Soviet restaurants or cafes. It is 
more than likely that these Soviet officials enjoyed privileged access to special shops 
called Beriozki and exclusive restaurants for the Moscow elite. These special shops 
and restaurants were considered to be far superior to what regular citizens had 
available to them. And despite privileged access to the USSR’s most exclusive 
services, the Soviet delegation was shocked by what they saw and tasted. A 
particularly striking observation they made was about the number of Canadian 
citizens who could afford to eat at McDonald’s as often as they wanted.91 
Additionally, the quality of service they received at this Canadian McDonald’s was 
on par with some of Moscow’s best restaurants, giving one a good idea of how far 
Soviet service standards had lagged behind the West.   
        Aware of the Soviets’ astonishment, Cohen shifted the topic of conversation to 
the possibility of introducing a McDonald’s to Moscow. The Soviet delegation 
thought this was an excellent idea, and even said they would relay the idea to their 
superiors. Motivated by what he saw and heard from the Soviet delegation, Cohen 
quickly phoned Fred Turner, CEO of McDonald’s Corporation backing the in United 
States, to pitch the idea. Fred Turner’s response was a simply “Go for it.” Just like 
that, the adventure to introduce a McDonalds into the heart of the Evil Empire was 
born. Cohen is frequently asked why it was specifically McDonalds-Canada that 
went into the Soviet Union, and not the American branch. People often assumed it 
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was part of some dark and nefarious plot to use McDonald’s-Canada as a 
smokescreen to further the goals of American commercial imperialism, when in 
reality Cohen claims it was nothing more than a simple phone call to his old friend 
Fred Turner that got the project underway.92  
        While Cohen asserts that there was no grand “Machiavellian” scheme hatched in 
a clandestine McDonald’s boardroom to bring the Big Mac to Moscow, it would be 
naive to think that McDonald’s-Canada wasn’t in a unique position to further the 
overall goals of the company. After all, a Soviet bureaucrat who is attempting to sell 
the idea of a McDonald’s in Moscow to his superiors would have a much easier time 
convincing them to approve the project if it was coming from somewhere other than 
the Soviet Union’s primary rival. Despite Canada’s position as a full-fledged member 
of the bourgeois West, it would be safe to argue that Canada maintained a more 
innocuous image in the eyes of the Soviet regime. In fact as of 1971, Canadian Prime 
Minster Pierre Trudeau introduced his Third Option Policy, which called for 
increased economic relations with Europe and the Soviet Union as a way of 
diminishing Canada’s reliance on American markets.93 Prime Minister Trudeau 
visited the Kremlin and gave a speech where he outlined his intentions to improve 
Soviet-Canadian relations “To achieve a satisfactory, just and continuing peace 
requires a climate of confidence, a climate in which men of differing social and 
economic system trust one another.”94 The 1970s were a time of improving 
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relations between Canada and the USSR. Subsequently, Fred Turner (CEO of 
McDonald’s-America) could have easily seen the advantages of using Canada as a 
surrogate to foster the growth of his company. Both men where excited about the 
project because they believed they could make it work, despite the massive 
obstacles in their path. The possibility of introducing a chain of McDonald’s 
restaurants into one of the world’s most populous nations was simply too good an 
opportunity to pass up.95 
 
McDonalds’ First Forays into the USSR 
        Between the chance meeting of George Cohen and the Soviet Olympic delegation 
in 1976, to the actual opening of the Moscow McDonald’s on Pushkin Square in 
1990, McDonald’s Corporation made two attempts at integrating itself into the 
Soviet market. The first was George Cohen’s costly and ultimately unsuccessful 
venture to have McDonald’s provide food for the 1980 Moscow Olympic games, and 
the second was the introduction of McDonald’s food service technology at the 
Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy (VDNH). Both these attempts 
were met with significant ideological and bureaucratic resistance.  Many of the 
obstacles the company would need to overcome where not only sizable, but entirely 
unique because of the nature of Soviet economics. Only with the arrival of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
94 Ibid. 65 
 
95 According to the 1979 official Soviet Census the population of the USSR was 261 million people, 
while Moscow’s population was 10.1 million people. For reference the population of the United 
States in 1980 was 221 million people. This presented a potentially lucrative market for McDonald’s 
corporation considering the Soviet Union was the third most populous nation in the world behind 
China and India. Moscow’s population alone contained about 45% of all of Canada’s total domestic 
population, which was about 24 million people in 1980. 
47 
Gorbachev and perestroika, would McDonald’s finally achieve success within the 
Soviet Union. 
        George Cohen’s first trip into the Soviet was in 1976, where his goal at the time 
was to establish a temporary presence at the 1980 Moscow Olympics.  By securing a 
deal to cater the international sporting event Cohen hoped to set up a beachhead on 
Soviet soil, from where he could then negotiate a more permanent presence for the 
company. This one-time deal had two benefits. First it made it easier for Soviet 
officials to pitch the idea to their superiors, since a temporary Western presence is 
much more palatable to Soviet hardliners. Second, Cohen hoped that the sales and 
profits this deal would generate for the Soviet Union would convince the skeptics on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain that McDonald’s in the USSR was a feasible endeavor.  
        Between 1976 and 1979 Cohen visited the Soviet Union at least 6 times a year 
and stay for a few weeks per visit. Talks to provide food for Olympic spectators 
began with a round of meetings between Cohen and Vladimir Koval, coach of the 
Soviet men’s basketball team.  After his first round of meetings, Cohen would 
bitterly discover the bureaucratic jungle he had just stepped into. The Soviets 
seemed to have a never-ending arsenal of bureaucratic diversionary tactics.  After a 
round of promising discussions, the Soviets would send in an entirely new 
negotiation team, meaning Cohen would have to essentially start at square one. 
Cohen’s dealings in the USSR were further complicated by last minute meeting 
cancelations, which was another favorite tactic of Soviet officials. “The Soviets were 
very good at making it seem as if you were making progress. Just enough to keep 
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you from giving up, but never enough to actually get anywhere.”96 Cohen’s 
frustrations soon multiplied, and so did his critics back home. As each year of 
tedious and hard-fought negotiations dragged on, Cohen was spending millions of 
dollars to keep the project alive. This massive investment, with little return proved 
to be a hard sell to his board of directors back home, all of whom unanimously 
doubted his ambitious project.   
        Cohen was equally thrown off by Russian culture as he was by Soviet 
bureaucracy. Russian’s traditional affinity for drinking alcohol as way of sealing 
business arrangements proved to be a bit overwhelming, as he was expected to 
drink copious amounts of vodka at the state dinners he attended. Not doing so 
would have been considered rude, and could have potentially jeopardized his 
business relationship with key Soviet officials. Cohen also had to learn that one of 
the most reliable currencies in the Soviet Union were Western cigarettes and 
McDonald’s paraphernalia. On every trip into the Soviet Union, Cohen brought with 
him cheap 12-dollar McDonald’s watches that he would hand out when he needed 
something done quickly. In one such episode, a Soviet hotel manager told Cohen that 
there were no rooms available, Cohen presented the manager with a McDonald’s 
novelty watch, and instantaneously a suite became available. Learning and adapting 
to these small idiosyncrasies of Soviet life would prove crucial to Cohen’s eventual 
success in the late 1980s.  
        After three and half years of painstaking negotiations to bring McDonald’s to the 
1980 Moscow Olympics, a concrete deal was finally within sight in 1979. Almost 
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every single last detail had been ironed out including: how many McDonald’s 
locations would be opened and at which venues; the interior and exterior designs of 
the temporary restaurants; their hours of operation; and what role the Soviet state 
would play in their management.97 The only remaining step in finalizing the deal 
was a formal signing ceremony to be held the next day. Cohen was told to go to his 
room at the Metropol hotel in Moscow and await a phone call at 10:00am. The next 
day Cohen receive his phone call, telling him that the official signing had been 
postponed and he would receive another phone call at 2:00pm with further 
instructions. The 2:00pm phone call came on schedule telling him the signing 
ceremony had been pushed back once again to the next day and that he would 
receive a subsequent call at 10:00am the next morning. The next day Cohen received 
his 10:00am phone call with the exact same message as the pervious day. This 
process of phone calls and postponements continued on for 17 days. Until on the 
18th day the call he received was different, this one informed him that the deal was 
off. At that time, in 1979, no reason was given to Cohen as to why the deal was called 
off at the last minute. Later it was revealed that Mikhail Suslov, chief of ideology for 
the Politburo, personally intervened and canceled the deal. The reason he gave for 
the cancelation was, “that such an arrangement would show the outside world that 
the Soviet Union could not provide food services for itself.”98 The news was 
absolutely devastating to Cohen, who had spent countless hours and millions of 
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dollars on the project.99 In the end however the cancelation of the deal proved to be 
a blessing in disguise due to the American boycott of the 1980 games. McDonald’s as 
a brand would have been put in a very difficult situation if they had carried out the 
deal over the objections of the American government. 
        It comes as no surprise that the Soviet regime of the late Brezhnev era 
eventually pulled out of the deal. The Soviet Union during this time period was still 
fighting a losing ideological struggle against what they termed as “cheap” bourgeois 
consumption. This is not say that Moscow bureaucrats were not willing to 
compromise on ideological purity for the sake of profit, because in a number of 
instances they consciously did just that. This was one of the reasons why the Pepsi 
deal back in 1972 was possible. Unfortunately for Cohen the issue of McDonald’s 
catering the Olympics simply had too many ideological negatives attached to it for 
party bosses like Suslov to allow a compromise. Furthermore, the McDonald’s deal 
was only supposed to be temporary, and would not be a source of long-term 
revenue for the state. From the point of view of the communist hardliners, not only 
did McDonald’s represent the worst kind of mass consumption, but also the 
potential profits were simply not substantial enough for Suslov to make an 
exception, as was done in the case of Pepsi-Cola.  
        Suslov himself was a strict party conservative who believed in communist 
orthodoxy.  Suslov’s stance in the 1970s and 80s was for a tougher foreign policy 
towards the West. Suslov’s biographer argues that by 1979 Suslov had reached the 
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height of his political power and was wielding as much or maybe more authority 
than the General Secretary himself.100 If this is indeed accurate then the cancelation 
of the McDonald’s deal came from the very highest levels of the Soviet government.  
        McDonald’s second foray into the Russian market was actually at the request of 
the Ministry of Internal trade and the Exhibition of Achievements of the National 
Economy or VDNH (Vystavka  Dostizheniy Narodnovo Khozyastva) in 1987. The 
VDNH was a national technology exhibition, similar to the Moscow Fair, which 
showed off all the latest gadgets and technological marvels of the USSR. The 
problem the organizers of the event were having was how to quickly and efficiently 
feed the 100,000 visitors the exhibition received each day.101 McDonald’s was 
contacted by Ministry of Internal Trade to help deal with this problem, seeing as 
how McDonald’s was the world leader in fast food. The idea behind it was to use 
McDonald’s technologies of food preparation and preservation to provide fast and 
efficient service. VDNH was designed to be a test run for a much larger project of 
expanding the USSR’s frozen food industry. The foods they planned to serve at the 
trade show would include fried chicken, hotdogs, and hamburgers.102 
        The wildly popular Soviet opinion magazine, Argumenty i Fakty, covered this 
story by interviewing Rudolf Anatolivich Chaianov (Director of the Department of 
Light Industry and Consumption from the State Committee on Technology and 
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Science). Chaianov explained to the correspondent that McDonald’s as a company 
has made considerable advances in the area of deep freezing and microwave 
technologies, areas where the Soviet Union has considerably lagged behind.103  He 
when on further to explain that the state has plans to set up a food industrial 
complex in 85 Soviet cities by the year 1990, aided by the technical know-how of 
McDonald’s.  The correspondent shared some of his concerns with the director, 
asking how this would affect tradition Russian cuisine if the Soviet Union switches 
over to frozen and microwavable foods. Chaianov assured the magazine that the 
ideal plan was to use McDonald’s technologies, but maintain the integrity of 
traditions Russian dishes. The interviewer also introduced questions from his 
readers, who were concerned that the Soviet Union should not be wasting money on 
foreign equipment and instead investing the funds into domestic production. A 
common complaint was that the USSR had capitulated to the West back in the 
1970’s when they signed a deal to allow Pepsi exclusive trade rights within the 
USSR. Soviet citizens were concerned that not enough had been done to promote the 
domestic beverage kvas as an alternative to Pepsi. In response Chaianov assured the 
readers of the magazine that this deal was in the best interests of the USSR. This 
defense by Chaianov was indeed accurate, as the Brezhnev regime had much gain 
from signing the deal with Pepsi. 
        This interview is significant for a number of reasons as it hits upon some 
important trends in Soviet culture, history and politics. First, the very fact that the 
Ministry of Trade was allowed to contact McDonalds in 1987 is indicative of 
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changing attitudes under perestroika. Hardliners like Mikhail Suslov were becoming 
much less of factor in dictating party ideology, taking into account the somewhat 
Slavophile nature of Argumenty i Fakty. Next, the importation of Western technology 
and equipment to stimulate the economy was nothing new when examining the 
entirety of Soviet history. Joseph Stalin’s first five-year plan involved considerable 
technical cooperation with the West, as a way to jumpstart various industrial 
sectors like automobile production and metallurgy.104 Additionally, we see 
references to the Soviet Union’s ambitious plans to export Soviet culture onto the 
world market, especially with their failed attempt at making kvas a competitive 
product with Coca-Cola.105 Finally, the interview touches upon the ever-present 
concern that Western influence corrupts and poisons traditional Russian/Soviet 
culture.  This was an ideological battle waged throughout all 74 years of Soviet 
history. In the end, the plan to use McDonald’s fast food technologies never 
materialized because McDonald’s-America was asking too high of a price for the 
equipment. It would take another two and half years for George Cohen to iron out all 
of the necessary details for a permanent presence in the Soviet Union. 
 
Problems of the Soviet Market 
        McDonald’s as a business faced considerable challenges in bringing their brand 
into the USSR. Most of these obstacles were entirely new for the corporation due to 
the unique nature of the Soviet economy. The McDonald’s deal was significantly 
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more difficult than the Pepsi deal because some of the problems Cohen contended 
with were non-issues for Donald Kendall. The process of opening a full-service 
restaurant is fundamentally more complicated than mixing concentrated syrup with 
carbonated water. First, the notorious unreliability of the agricultural sector in the 
Soviet Union meant that consistent produce deliveries could not be guaranteed. 
Second, without the aid of an American president or a personal relationship with 
Leonid Brezhnev, Cohen’s project would be tied up in the quagmire of Soviet 
bureaucracy for years. Third, the general poverty of Soviet citizens meant that they 
would have less disposable income to spend on fast food. Fourth, the service culture 
of the USSR was terribly unfriendly and many skeptics worried Russians could not 
be trained to meet McDonald’s high standards of professionalism and hospitality.  
Finally, the most significant obstacle was how to properly convert rubles into hard 
Western currency, a problem Donald Kendall managed to solve with his syrup for 
vodka exchange. All of these problems would eventually be solved through 
ingenuity and unconventional methods. 
        The grossly inefficient nature of Soviet agriculture would make operating a 
McDonald’s restaurant nearly impossible. If consistent produce delivers could not 
be ensured then the McDonald’s brand simply could not function. Despite 
considerable investments into farming by the Brezhnev regime in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s the productivity of Soviet farms continued to drop. In 1981 the grain 
harvest was so low that Moscow never officially announced output figures.106 Much 
of the problem stemmed from over-centralization and incompetence on the part of 
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Soviet bureaucrats.107 Meat production was yet another weakness of the Soviet 
economy, which dropped after hitting its peak production in 1978 from 15 million 
tons to 13 million tons in 1981.108 Obviously, meat shortages were a serious concern 
for a company whose primary product was the hamburger.  
        To solve their produce problems in the USSR, McDonald’s had achieve a level of 
vertical economic integration it had never needed in the past. Traditionally all meat, 
vegetable, and material needs of the company were outsourced to local growers and 
manufactures. This business model was simply not possible in the USSR. To satisfy 
its vegetable and meat requirements, McDonald’s needed to establish special farms 
whose sole task would be to provide produce and meat for the Moscow restaurant. 
To meet its manufacturing needs the company would build a 10,000 square meter 
state-of–the-art manufacturing complex in the Solntsevo district of southwestern 
Moscow.109 The manufacturing complex was nicknamed the “McComplex”, (Fig. 4) 
and it would be responsible for ensuring all food quality standards were meet. The 
McComplex was an enormous white building, which was built with the assistance of 
15 countries in 1989.110 The complex consisted of 12 assembly lines for the 
processing of milk, meat, potatoes, vegetables, mustard, ketchup, and various 
condiments as well as sauces.111 The complex also contained dozens of industrial 
                                                        
 
107 Ibid. 42 
 
108 Ibid. 42 
 
109 V. Chebakov, "Tol’ko za Rubli." Pravda, January 30, 1990, p. 6. 
 
110 Ibid. 
 
56 
ovens for the baking of apples pies, and the quality of the ingredients was supposed 
to match that of Canadian and American standards. Two workers within the 
complex were specifically tasked with making sure the buns for McDonalds burgers 
come out exactly circular, if they did not meet the stringent standards, the irregular 
buns were quickly discarded. A special assignment in the processing factory even 
included the measuring of every potato with a ruler to ensure that each order of 
French fries had an even mixture of long, medium and short fries.112 At peak 
capacity the McComplex could reach an output of 10 thousand beef patties, 14 
thousand sesame buns, and 5 thousand apple pies an hour! McDonald’s of Russia 
would control every level of production in the supply chain, from the grower to the 
distributor. Also, it is important to understand that the failure of the first 
McDonald’s in the USSR due to supply reasons would have reflected very poorly on 
the reforms of perestroika and the state of the Soviet economy in general. This is 
why the Gorbachev government went out of their way to ensure a steady supply of 
goods to the Moscow McDonalds. As Pravda commented, “the success of this 
restaurant depends on the patriotic hard work of our farmers and agricultural 
laborers.”113 
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Figure 4. The “McComplex” 
        The stifling nature of Soviet bureaucracy was the second major hurdle that 
needed to be overcome. As one Pravda journalist so eloquently put it “it is a miracle 
the project was not destroyed on the coral reefs of Soviet bureaucracy.”114 In fact, 
these problems were so pervasive that they became a well-known issue even 
outside the USSR. Countless Soviet films and shows poked fun at the endless 
paperwork and documentation one needed to get anything done. George Cohen 
recalls during his negotiations with amazement at the myriad of rubberstamps one 
needed to collect from various officials just to get paperwork processed. Out of 
frustration Cohen even had his own rubberstamp made that said “chush” meaning 
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nonsense in Russian.115 After a long hard day he would take his anger out by 
stamping documents with his nonsense stamp. 
        The bureaucracy problem never really went away, but it was mitigated by two 
factors, the first being Cohen’s ability to adapt, and the second being perestroika. In 
his memoirs Cohen writes,  
We gradually learned the ropes. We slowly learned about the codes and 
the intrigues and the subtleties and the secret signs. We never cracked 
the Soviet bureaucratic code entirely, but at least we came to realize 
things were not always as they seemed. For instance, you could meet 
with one official who would tell you to your face that he was eager to 
help you. In fact all he wanted was to get ride of you. He would hurry 
you out of his office by writing a letter to be shown to some other Soviet 
official who was on your list of important people to see. The letter would 
say “Please give all assistance to these wonderful people.” Which was 
great-except that if he signed on, say, the left side of the page, instead of 
the right, the letter would actually tell the official who read it to do 
exactly the opposite of what the letter said.116 
 
Besides Cohen’s keen decoding skills, perestroika and glasnost helped to streamline 
the negotiation process. Cohen even managed to develop a personal relationship 
with Mikhail Gorbachev who contributed a forward to Cohen’s memoirs. The 
personal relationship these men developed over the late 1980s went a long way to 
tearing down bureaucratic roadblocks. The fact that Cohen’s negations became 
infinitely easier when he had gained the attention and friendship of Mikhail 
Gorbachev goes to show that knowing the right people made all the difference in the 
Soviet Union. This was a major advantage Donald Kendall had over George Cohen, as 
Kendall personally knew the top leaders of the USSR such as Leonid Brezhnev and 
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Alexei Kosygin. Kendall also had the invaluable aid of President Richard Nixon, 
without whom, the business deal may never have happened. 
        The general poverty of the Soviet Union was certainly a concern for the 
McDonald’s team. 89% of the Soviet population made less than 175 rules per month, 
while the average income of a Soviet citizen was 112 rubles per month in 1980.117 
By 1989 the average income would rise slightly to 151 rubles per month.118 When 
converted to US dollars the average income of a Soviet citizen was just 201 dollars 
per month or 2,412 dollars per year.119 For reference, per capita yearly income in 
the United was 9,494 dollars in 1980.120 That means the average Soviet citizen made 
7,082 less dollars than the average American citizen or about 475% less per capita. 
This wide income disparity would certainly mean the average Soviet consumer 
would not be able to afford eating at McDonald’s on a consistent basis. The income 
issue was certainly a concern, but it was one McDonald’s leadership would simply 
have to adjust to. Obviously petitioning the Soviet government to raise salaries was 
entirely out of the question. When the when the first McDonald’s location opened, 
the price of a Big Mac value meal was 5 rubles and 65 kopeks.121 Since the average 
monthly income in 1989 was 151 rubles, this meant that eating a McDonald’s was a 
pricy proposition. Fortunately for Cohen, the poverty of Soviet citizens turned out to 
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be a non-issue, just like the case of Pepsi in Novorossik, the relatively expense price 
of these Western foods was not a factor for enthusiastic Russian consumers. 
        A ubiquitous characteristic of the Soviet service sector was its unfriendliness. 
This issue was covered at length by the Soviet Press who commented on the 
unpleasant and discourteous nature of customer service in the Soviet Union. Pravda 
made comments like “waiters in the USSR get angry at clients for the slightest 
violations of their peace”122 Other journalists pointed out that McDonald’s would 
not survive in the USSR because the employees would be rude to their guests. The 
popular journal Argumenty i Fakty also predicted that no matter how much foreign 
technical know-how was brought in for the restaurant, the human factor would be 
McDonalds’ biggest problem.123  A common Soviet saying was frequently brought up 
in the press as an example of Soviet laziness “They pretend to pay us, we pretend to 
work”124 These problems were all real enough, even Cohen himself describes Soviet 
restaurants as “vast coldly formal dinning rooms that were always out of everything 
and where the waitress or waiter seemed physically incapable of smiling.”125 This 
issue was not just a problem in restaurants and cafes but endemic to the whole 
system, as retail and shopping was plagued with the same problems of poor and 
unfriendly customer service.126  
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        To address labor and hospitality concerns, McDonald’s set up a 1000-hour 
training course for its management staff.127 These managers were then responsible 
for training employees who applied to the restaurant. The training system was one 
of the most rigorous in the whole company. When dealing with the press and 
skeptics about the potential of Russian workers, Cohen would respond to their 
concerns by asking one simple question “Who wins the most medals at the 
Olympics.” The reporters and skeptics would then respond with “Well the Soviets.” 
This allowed Cohen to follow up with “If the young men and women of the Soviet 
Union can consistently beat the Americans and Canadians at sports, then they can 
surely be trained to serve food at a high level.” This response from Cohen is 
something the Soviet press printed with great amusement, because after all, Cohen 
was not only massaging the ego of the Soviet Union, but he also had a legitimate 
point. 
        The final and perhaps most troubling problem McDonald’s had to deal with was 
how to convert the Soviet ruble into Western currency. As mentioned, the ruble was 
a hollow currency that was heavily manipulated by the government, and a real 
conversion rate could not be established for mass transactions. In his 1972 Pepsi 
deal, Donald Kendall brilliantly circumvented the ruble by forcing the Soviets to pay 
for Pepsi syrup with the American dollars they earned from Stolichnaya Vodka sales 
in the United States. This type of workaround was obviously not possible since 
establishing McDonald’s in the USSR was a one-way deal. Many of Cohen’s advisors 
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recommended that the first McDonald’s accept only hard Western currency. This 
however would exclude the majority of the Soviet population, because it was illegal 
to own and use American dollars. This simply was not an option because to Cohen, 
McDonald’s was an all inclusive family restaurant, and only having it open to 
foreigners would compromise everything the company stood for. It would also 
heavily hamper the restaurants ability to make a profit. 
        A few solutions were proposed, first was to use the rubles earned from the 
restaurant to purchase Soviet made goods or even crude oil that could then be 
shipped out of the country and sold on the foreign market. Another solution was to 
use the rubles to buy real estate in the USSR and then lease it out to other foreign 
companies for Western currency. The final solution was to just invest all earned 
rubles into building more McDonalds locations, and eventually a reasonable 
conversion rate could be established in the future. The problem would eventually 
solve itself however, since the collapse of the USSR made currency trading a much 
simpler process. 
 
Success at Last 
        The turning point in Cohen’s negotiations came with the introduction of 
glasnost and perestroika. Cohen’s failure in 1979 to bring McDonald’s to the 
Olympics did not deter him, and after a few months he returned to the Soviet Union 
with the goal of establishing a permanent restaurant. The connections he had 
developed over the early 1980s brought him to the attention of a rising star within 
the Communist party, a man by the name of Mikhail Gorbachev, who frequently 
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spoke of sweeping reforms. In 1987, one of perestroika’s most significant reforms 
allowed foreign investors up to 49 percent ownership with Soviet partners. These 
would be the terms on which the first McDonald’s would be established in an official 
partnership with Glavobshchepit (primary public food distributor). The Soviet state 
would own 51 percent of the restaurant, and McDonald’s-Canada the remaining 49 
percent.128  The location for the restaurant was negotiated at the very last stages of 
the deal, and after much debate, the site of the old Café Lyra on Pushkin Square was 
chosen. Soviet property values we determined in a rather simplistic way. “Their 
system of evaluation was based on an arbitrary application of zones concentric 
circles were drawn from the center of Moscow, and anything within a certain zone 
was given an automatic, undisputable price tag.”129 Naturally since the proposed 
location was in the heart of Moscow, the property value was some of the highest in 
the city. It is unclear exactly what McDonald’s of Canada paid for the location, but 
after 14 years of negations the final price for bringing McDonald’s to the USSR was 
around 50 million dollars.130 This massive investment was made before even one 
burger or order of French fries was sold. 
        There was great fanfare and excitement on opening day, as various Soviet media 
outlets reported on the event with opinions raging from cautious optimism to 
uneasy pessimism. Pravda’s reporting on the event was generally positive, calling 
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McDonald’s a reinvigoration of the soul of public catering in the USSR.131 The 
coverage by Izvestia was a bit more mixed, as some writers claimed it was a 
revolution in the country’s relations with the West, while others made doomsday 
prognoses. Stanislav Kondrashov (a journalist for Izvestia) predicted that within six 
months the crushing bureaucracy and corruption of the Soviet system would 
destroy the McDonald’s, and the company would have to save their employees with 
helicopters from the rooftops. He is of course referring to America’s last minute 
scramble to save U.S. embassy workers in Saigon at the end of the Vietnam War. 
        The Soviet press seemed to take great delight in reporting various statistics 
about the Pushkin Square McDonald’s. The location served 50,000 people a day, had 
an occupancy limit of 700 people at a time, and employed 1200 workers. Pravda and 
Izvestiia also reported with pride on the output of the 10,000 square meter 
McComplex, built outside of Moscow that supplied the Pushkin Square location. The 
weekly output of the food-processing factory was 55,000 kilograms of beef, 72 tons 
of fries, 68,000 liters of special sauce, and 9,000 kilograms of milkshakes.132 This 
kind of reporting harkens back to the glory days of Stalinist industrialization when 
all media outlets eagerly reported on the tonnage of steel or pig iron put out by the 
various factories springing up all over the USSR. Between 1990 and 1995 the 
Pushkin Square McDonald’s drew 80 million visitors, more than the Kremlin or 
Lenin’s tomb, making it the busiest McDonald’s in the world.133 
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A centerpiece of Cohen’s policy was to make the Pushkin Square McDonald’s 
accessible to every Soviet citizen, not matter their social standing.  For Cohen, it was 
absolutely critical that anyone could walk off the street and purchase a Big Mac. The 
problem with making the restaurant open to the general public meant that the 
restaurant would have to accept Soviet rubles, in spite of the currency’s 
unconvertible status on the world market. Opening a restaurant that only accepted 
hard currency was an unacceptable proposition, because it would severely limit 
potential profits, and it went against everything McDonald’s stood for. During his 
journey to open a restaurant, George Cohen encountered (what seemed to him at 
the time) a rather strange phenomenon. Throughout most of the Soviet period, the 
best retail stores in the country were only available to foreign dignitaries or high-
ranking Soviet officials. These exclusive stores were known as Beriozki, and the only 
payment they accepted was hard foreign currency. Outside of every Beriozka store, 
hung a very distinct bronze and gold-plated signs that said in Russian “this store 
accepts hard currency only.” These private stores for the upper class were stocked 
with the best goods and products, which resulted in them being unanimously hated 
by ordinary people in the Soviet Union, and represented some of the worst aspects 
of upper class privilege.134 Cohen even recalls a time when he took one of his 
Russian translators into a Beriozka store with him, and she broke down crying from 
the sight of all the goods she and her family would never has access to.135 As Cohen 
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was finalizing the details for his restaurant he was struck with a brilliant idea. Cohen 
decided he would make a duplicate of the signs that typically hung outside of the 
Beriozka stores, but instead of having the sign say “hard currency only” he would 
have it say “rubles only.” (Fig. 5) This sign was of course intended as a parody of the 
signs that were displayed outside the hated Beriozka stores. When the Pushkin 
Square McDonald’s opened in January of 1990, his mock sign was hung right at the 
front entrance.  Cohen’s sign was a public relations triumph, as it earned him extra 
publicity in many American and Soviet newspapers. In one fell swoop Cohen had 
managed to endear himself to the Soviet public, and attack decades of socialist 
inequality. A number of years later Pravda even awarded Cohen the title of “Hero of 
Capitalist Labor” for his ingenious sign.136  
                               
Figure 5. Cohen’s famous sign at the Pushkin Square McDonald’s in 2013 
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Why Soviets Went to McDonald’s 
          It was no secret that Soviet citizens, especially the younger generations 
idealized Western culture. This can be seen time and time again from their choice of 
films, music, and literature. Many Soviets saw foreign films as a form of cultural 
tourism. Sergey Zhuk writes that genuine American Westerns were popular because 
people got a feeling of authenticity from the cacti and exotic American deserts in 
these films.137 To many young Soviets, America was that shinning city upon a hill, 
and by patronizing the restaurant they gained access to the American Camelot. 
People didn’t just go to McDonald’s because they wanted a taste of American cuisine, 
but because they craved a taste of American service, efficiency, and quality. The 
Pushkin Square McDonald’s was clean, bright, warm, and inviting. The employees 
were friendly, well dressed in their clean and pressed uniforms, hospitable, and 
professional, all this contrasted sharply with the Soviet service sector, which was 
just terrible in every respect. The food at McDonald’s arrived quickly, tasted good, 
and most importantly was delivered with a smile. Even The New York Times picked 
up on the service revolution, commenting that McDonald’s offered something rare in 
Soviet society, polite workers.138 Much like the Indian movies of 1960s and 70s, 
which offered Soviet citizens a cultural escape to an exotic, colorful and warm land, 
McDonald’s was an escape from the drab monochrome nature of customer service in 
the USSR. Dining at McDonald’s was an experience well beyond eating merely 
burger and fries; it was it was a taste of American quality. 
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        It is true that the motivation for many Soviet citizens to visit McDonald’s was 
driven by an idealization of the West, but in many ways it was an example of 
progress within their own nation. McDonald’s was a sign that perestroika was 
making substantive changes to their society.  Before McDonald’s, perestroika was 
just an abstraction, a lofty concept, but with the arrival of the restaurant, 
perestroika became a reality. Soviet citizens could touch, smell and taste their very 
own piece of perestroika.  Izvestiia called it a symbol of changing times and a 
revolution with out relations to the West.139 The opening was celebrated like the 
inauguration of an American president.140 Because in a way it was just as important, 
it meant that better days are on the horizon, and the day saw queues the spanned 
several city blocks. (Fig. 6)  The Gorbachev administration wanted the restaurant to 
succeed just as much as George Cohen did, maybe even more. As a reformer, 
Gorbachev’s credibility was tried up in the survival of this bold initiative. As Izvestiia 
reported “This McDonald’s will be a test of the endurance and strength of the 
McDonald’s franchise and also our perestroika.141 This is how Gorbachev’s policy of 
perestroika and the golden arches of McDonald’s became one.  
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Figure 6. A queue several blocks long forming on opening day 
 
Working at McDonald’s 
        A few months before the opening of the Pushkin Square location, Cohen and his 
management team began an exhaustive search for employees. Since the bulk of the 
workforce would come from the Soviet population, McDonald’s began a recruitment 
drive for qualified Muscovites to staff their restaurant. Glenn Stevens, the human 
resources manager at the Pushkin square location, said in his interview with Pravda, 
that the most desired qualities of a McDonald’s employee include openness, 
courtesy, and communication skills.142 The amount of applications Cohen and 
Stevens received was overwhelming, 30,000 thousand in total.143 Out of the 30,000 
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applicants, 6000 were interviewed, and 600 were eventually hired, although an 
additional 600 were hired after the restaurant opened, bringing the total staff to 
1,200 people. Employee training consisted of a 30-hour course on proper customer 
service techniques, and the importance of working as a team. The age range for the 
average employee at the Moscow McDonald’s was 16 to 25 years old, and for the 
majority of them, this was their first job.144 Additionally, about half of the staff 
worked at the restaurant on a part-time basis, and were either high school or 
university students. For those employees who did not work full-time, the average 
number of hours worked per week was 12-15 and, these workers were told that 
school and family must come first, and work was only a secondary priority in life. 
The company was always willing to accommodate worker’s schedules and be 
flexible with their personal matters. 
        Glenn Stevens had nothing but praise for his Soviet workforce when talking to 
Pravda. According to him, 75 people of the original 600 employees had already been 
promoted to instructors, 50 to shift managers, and 9 people had made it to the 
position of deputy directors in charge of training.145 Steven’s commented that 
McDonald’s was not just a job, but a large family, and employees of the Moscow 
McDonald’s frequently organized social events and workplace outings, as a way of 
building camaraderie. There was also an employee of the month program started up 
to keep the workforce motivated, and those awarded with the honor would receive 
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bonuses to their pay.  When visiting executives from McDonald’s-Canada toured the 
Pushkin Square restaurant they were all very impressed with the quality of the 
Soviet workers.146 
        When asked by Pravda, “what kind of benefits does working at McDonald’s 
bring?”, Stevens responded by say “workers have the opportunity to earn a decent 
living and provide for their families, but most importantly they will learn job skills 
that can be applied in their future careers.”147 The reporter interviewing Stevens, 
finished the interview by commenting “while McDonald’s is not capable of feeding 
our boundless country, the skills it will teach youth will be invaluable experience for 
them as workers.” Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this article is an artist’s 
rendition of how McDonald’s will transform lazy and slovenly Soviet teens into, 
presentable and well-groomed citizens. This illustration is quite paradoxical, (Fig. 7) 
as the Soviet leadership and press have frequently stressed the transformative 
effects of labor on the human soul, but now it was happening under the auspices of a 
capitalistic American corporation. 
                                                        
 
146 Ibid 
 
147 Ibid 
72 
 
Figure 7. McDonald’s transforming Soviet Youth 
Conclusion 
        McDonald’s in the Soviet Union is not just a narrative of one fast food restaurant 
in Pushkin Square, but a tale that involves the collision of culture, ideology, and 
economics on the highest stages of world politics. The struggle to bring the golden 
arches to Russia highlights some of the worst aspects of Soviet society: the crushing 
bureaucracy, the backwards economy, and the inhospitable service sector. In some 
ways McDonald’s was similar to other forms of Western culture that slowly trickled 
into the USSR. Much like films and music it provided Soviets with a taste of the 
American spirit, but in other ways McDonald’s was entirely unique as a cultural 
product. No other American import became so closely tied to the improvement of 
the Soviet Union, and there is simply no other Western brand, which so closely 
represented the government’s drive to reform. Before perestroika and McDonald’s, 
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the official Soviet stance was begrudging acceptance of Western popular culture, but 
after McDonald’s and perestroika it wholly welcomed American investment. 
Unfortunately the perestroika experiment proved to be a failure as the Soviet Union 
collapsed a year and a half later. McDonald’s on the other hand was a resounding 
success. As of today the Pushkin square McDonald’s remains one of busiest in the 
world, and the largest in Europe. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
PepsiCo and McDonald’s in the USSR are valuable cases studies for the field of Soviet 
history.  The introduction of these two brands highlights the interplay of politics, 
business, culture, and economics between a socialist and capitalist society in a way 
other American imports could not. Very little secondary work has been done about 
American food as a form of cultural consumption in the USSR. American films, 
television shows, and music have been the items featured most prominently in 
works about American consumer goods in the communist nation, but they do not 
give us a complete picture of how Soviets consumed foreign imports. Additionally, 
films or music cannot give an accurate representation of the difficulty in establishing 
a fully operational for-profit business in a centrally planned economy. These cases 
studies also give us an idea of how and why the Soviet regime sanctioned American 
entry into their market. The Pepsi deal for instance showcases the advantage of 
having the right political allies when dealing with the USSR. McDonald’s on the other 
hand, points out just how far service standards had lagged behind the West. The two 
cases also have comparative value since they dealt with many of the same problems. 
Furthermore, PepsiCo’s success in the early 1970s shows why McDonald’s failed to 
establish itself in that same decade. 
        Interestingly enough both cases are representative of the Soviet Union’s need to 
make compromises and bend its own party rhetoric when dealing with the West. 
The Pepsi deal provided the Soviet regime with three immediate benefits, first they 
would stand to make a profit from licensed Pepsi sales. Second, they would mitigate 
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lost revenue front state alcohol sales by exporting vodka to the West. Finally, the 
chance to export one of their own domestic products into the West was seen as a 
victory for Soviet industry, and the fact that it sold so well only reinforced this 
notion. While the Soviets were probably not trilled being associated with only good 
vodka, it is telling that Stolichnaya’s “Russianness” made it the second best selling 
vodka in the United States. There were of course elements within the Soviet regime 
that opposed the Pepsi deal, but they were either ignored or quickly silenced. 
Furthermore, McDonald’s entry into the USSR was also a compromise. The fact that 
McDonald’s-Canada was the primary force behind the company’s entrance into the 
USSR is indicative of a lingering uneasiness with American goods. Since the 
corporation was coming through Canada it allowed the Soviets reap the benefits this 
company would bring, but still keep direct American involvement to a minimum. 
        We also see that each brand became linked to a major political policy of the Cold 
War. During the 1970s Pepsi became emblematic of Richard Nixon’s détente. Nixon 
actively promoted friendlier relations between the U.S. and USSR, and saw the 1971 
trade mission as an excellent starting point for negations. However it was no 
accident that Nixon sent his friend Donald Kendall on the trade mission. Nixon was 
there for Kendall’s prior success with the Soviet in 1959, and Nixon knew that 
Kendall’s idea to bring Pepsi into the USSR would be a good way of strengthening 
relations. When Nixon and Kendall lobbied the American Congress to pass the 1974 
Trade Reform Act, a central argument Richard Nixon presented was that the trade 
barriers must be lowered because they could irrevocably damage the fragile détente 
he had built in the previous years. 
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        McDonald’s also represented a major initiative during the Cold War, except this 
time, it was within the Soviet Union itself. Perestroika was Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
grand plan to reform the Soviet economy. For Gorbachev, McDonald’s present an 
excellent opportunity that fell in line with his strategy, which is why he went out of 
his way to help George Cohen. The American corporation represented speed, 
efficiency and quality, three things the Soviet economy was severely lacking. By 
bringing in foreign investment, the Gorbachev government could point to the very 
tangible restaurant as proof of substantive progress in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev 
staked his credibility on the success of the venture, and failure would have been 
disastrous. 
        Finally, these two companies are only the tip of the iceberg when examining 
foreign business in the USSR. This is a field that is relatively wide open in Soviet 
history and more research avenues are certainly available. Besides American goods, 
the Soviet also made deals with various European corporations, and examining how 
these companies interacted with the Soviet state would pride a more complete 
picture of Western-Soviet business relations.   
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